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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Jay Peterson, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, Appellate Case No. 20010319-
CA 
v. 
City of Provo, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Appeai from the Fourth Dtstric, Court,
 U t a h C o u n t y , J u d g e 
REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
FILED 
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1 Due Process was not provided by a biased hearing officer who, with actual 
hostility and actual bias, was found by District Judge Schofield to be "patently 
unfair." 
The City of Provo has confused this issue in its brief by a vague reference to V^l 
Oil Company vs. Dept of Environmental Quality, 939 P2d 1192 (S.Ct. Utah 1997). The 
Supreme Court in that case reversed the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in V-1 Oil 
Company vs. Dept of Environmental Quality, 893 P2d 1093 (Utah App.1995). 
Contrary to the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court in V-1 Oil found that prior 
to the hearing and prior to any showing of actual bias, a staff attorney for the Department 
could not be presumed biased and disqualified as a hearing officer in accusatory 
proceedings brought by the Department as long as he personally did not participate in the 
investigation and prosecution. 
Provo City's use of this holding in V-1 Oil is a classic use of a "straw man" 
argument intended to divert this Court of Appeals from the real issues. 
The real issue in this case is the actual receipt by the hearing officer of $100 in 
pecuniary benefit, the actual hostility and actual bias shown from the record, as 
demonstrated by the following analysis as well as by the finding by Judge Schofield. 
After reading the transcript, hearing the parties, and considering the exhibits, Judge 
Schofield found that it was "patently unfair" for that hearing officer to have ordered the 
defendant/appellant to pay him the $100 in costs. (See footnote 3, page 4 of his Ruling, 
Addendum 2, Appellee's brief.) 
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For legal authority on the real issues, we need only look more closely at the 
Supreme Court's guidelines in V-l Oil, which are summarized at pages 1197,98 as: 
"Commentators have noted that accusatory proceedings, due to their similarity in 
both form and consequence to formal criminal proceedings, require particular attention to 
due process concerns. (Cit. omitted) Therefore, stricter due process requirements apply 
to adversarial, adjudicative decision making than to legislative type decision making. 
The most fundamental requirement in this context is "the opportunity to be heard cat a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" (Cit. omitted) As a necessary corollary 
to this opportunity, affected parties must receive adequate notice, and they must be 
assured that their concerns will be heard by an impartial decision maker. (Cit. omitted) 
"Scholars and judges consistently characterize provision of a neutral decisionmaker as 
one of the three or four core requirements of a system of fair adjudicatory decision 
making." (Cit. omitted) Where a party to an adversary proceedings can demonstrate 
actual impermissible bias or an unacceptable risk of an impermissible bias on the part of 
a decision maker, the decision maker must be disqualified... A clear demonstration of 
partiality apparent on the face of the record (Cit.omitted) or a showing of direct, 
pecuniary interest (Cit, omitted) automatically requires disqualification of the decision 
maker... The presence of a clear, substantial pecuniary benefit is one of the most evident 
causes of either conscious or subconscious bias; and perhaps more important, it is the 
type of temptation that inevitably compromises public confidence in the process itself, 
undermining the legitimacy of any decision so tainted. Thus, the (U.S.) Supreme Court 
concluded that disqualifying bias will be presumed whenever the decision maker has a 
substantial pecuniary interest in the outcome.(Cit, omitted)" 
The Utah Supreme Court then cited, among others, Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.510, 
531-35,47 S.Ct 437,444-45,71 L.Ed. 749 (1927). In Tumey, the U.S. Supreme Court 
found a due process violation when the mayor acted as the hearing officer and was paid 
for the hearing from the $12 in costs that he imposed only upon conviction, finding, 
"The mayor of the village of North College, Ohio, had a direct personal pecuniary 
interest in convicting the defendant who came before him for trial, in the twelve dollars 
of costs imposed in his behalf." 
In addition to this presumptive due process violation arising from the payment of 
$100 in costs to this hearing officer only upon "conviction," his actual bias and hostility 
demonstrated during the hearing have been gross and blatant. Your appellant, who is pro 
se and not an expert on administrative law, was completely naive at the time of the 
hearing and did not know that the frequent bias of administrative judges was already a 
bitterly contested legal issue. It was only when he was slapped in the face by the 
obviously biased hearing officer, who tried to stifle and virtually shout down any 
criticisms of Provo City at the hearing, and then received another slap in the face from 
the grossly unfair order to pay $100 for the hard labor of this biased performance, that 
your appellant from actual experience discovered the extent of bias that Provo City has 
created in its pet court. Citizens will never believe that this system is fair, no matter how 
many times a distant Supreme Court could be tricked into saying that yes indeed, it's 
really, really fair. 
It should be noted that the Supreme Court's reversal in V-l Oil of the Utah Court 
of Appeals, on a different issue, was motivated in large part by the alleged imp>racticality 
and expense of providing a truly unbiased judge instead of the internal, highly suspect 
staff attorney for the Department. It would not be at all impractical or more expensive 
for Provo City to provide that its hearing officers are appointed by a neutral judge in a 
fair manner such as by random rotation, instead of directly by the specific prosecutor to 
further his unrestrained power, whims, and malice. Under the present system the 
prosecutor makes telephone calls to lawyers with (or without) experience as 
administrative judges until she finds one who seems to be adequately "cooperative," who 
she can then control quite effectively. A neutral judge would appoint hearing officers 
from the same list of experienced lawyers, at the same expense, but without the corrupt 
element of prosecutor control This small reform would cost nothing. The lengthy 
opinion of this Court of Appeals in the first V-l Oil case is an excellent, detailed brief in 
support of this easy reform. It is the same reform that all of the lawyers and ethics 
committees have been vigorously advocating for many years. 
When your appellant saw the hearing officer and the extremely dishonest 
prosecutor meeting privately for a social break and overheard them laughing together at 
the discomfiture of another defendant, it was just too obvious that the prosecutor can and 
does substantially control the judge under the present grossly unfair system. If English 
grammar usage is still an accurate test, then this particular prosecutor, Mr. Davis, cannot 
have more than a sixth grade education. Somehow, the least educated and most corrupt 
elements of Provo society have gained control of the judicial process. 
To give some perspective to the extent of this problem, appellant cites his own 
letter to the hearing officer "denigrating" the system of building permits that should have 
been made a part of the record in this case. That letter cited appellant's discovery that the 
secretary of the building department, on the last hour before her sudden "vacation," could 
not find building permits for two additions built to the front of the home of an influential 
"neighborhood chairman" living nearby in Provo. Recently, after substantial further 
investigation by appellant, he has discovered that the likely reason for this lack of permits 
is the impossibility of complying with the hillside ordinance in Provo. The "chairman" 
would have been required to employ a very expensive licensed engineer who 
undoubtably would have insisted upon an exploratory fifteen foot deep trench fifty feet to 
the east and west of the proposed additions to examine the safety of the soil structure. 
Such trenching (and more) was militantly required of another neighbor building a new 
home. But this necessary exploration would have required a virtually impossible, quite 
dangerous tunnel under his existing home. Thus the "chairman" probably never obtained 
the building permits for the two additions and relied upon either his influence or even 
downright bribery to protect himself from later repercussions or prosecutions. The same 
conundrum would affect thousands of other Provo residents living on the bench, where 
hundreds of additions are built every year. A preliminary picture starts to emerge of a 
cesspool of corruption in Provo where influence, cronyism, or bribery (not to mention 
racism) have completely overwhelmed the rule of law. This is hardly the time for the 
Utah Court of Appeals to rubber stamp a phony court to keep this likely graft flowing. 
1L The other due process violations not only by themselves require reversal, 
but also further prove the actual bias of the hearing officer. 
First we find the City of Provo telling us in its brief that notice of "illegal 
accessory building" is adequate and that (contradictorily) it was "appellant's fault" 
that he didn't receive notice. The hearing officer, in between private sessions with 
the grossly dishonest prosecutor laughing at the defendants, also found the oxymoron 
of "constructive notice." 
How could a licensed attorney, the hearing officer, casually invent the concept of 
"constructive notice" unless he was totally biased and himself dishonest? The law is 
ever so clear that notice must be actual. There just isn't any wiggle room even for the 
slipperiest lawyer in the law of due process for "constructive notice." 
Likewise, the notice given by Provo for "illegal building" is about as much notice 
as charging a criminal defendant with "illegal activity." Notice is simply not 
constitutionally adequate unless it provides enough information so that a litigant will 
know what issues will be tried and can prepare his evidence and defense with enough 
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time for a meaningful hearing. The notice given was so vague and so far from actual 
notice of the issues that would be raised at the hearing that it borders on contempt of 
court for Provo City to then plead speciously that it was somehow "appellant's fault" 
that he didn't know what issues would be raised by the shifty, fumbling prosecutor at 
the hearing. Is there any court in America so insensitive to basic fairness that it 
would buy into Provo's ridiculous argument? 
Then consider the hearsay comment that the shifty prosecutor slipped into the 
record at the end of the hearing that there was no building permit for one of the sheds. 
The hearing officer immediately, actually eagerly, accepted this hearsay as conclusive 
evidence. The law provides that the records exception to hearsay requires the 
custodian to introduce the records and then respond to cross-examination. The 
eagerness of the hearing officer to accept a hearsay comment, the only evidence that 
an existing building was not initially permitted, as conclusive evidence of violation, 
not only by itself violates due process, but also is yet more evidence of the pervasive 
bias of the hearing officer. 
The Provo City ordinances themselves make it clear that hearsay cannot be used 
in an ordinance prosecution. As a licensed attorney, and in order to pass the bar 
exams, the hearing officer would have had to know that the constitutional law of due 
process also bars the use of hearsay. But instead, he eagerly endorsed and exploited 
the due process violation to find the one conviction that he needed to extort his $100 
in pay from another victim, the laughingstock of his private sessions with the 
dishonest prosecutor. He virtually shouted down appellant's objection to this hearsay 
evidence at the hearing. The woman who hired him, the chief prosecutor for the City 
for zoning violations, included in her letter to appellant her "ruling" that hearsay 
evidence would be admissible, contrary to the ordinances. (Isn't it revealing that the 
City's head prosecutor can manage to provide advance written notice of the 
prosecutor's pet rules of law, albeit illegal ones, misrepresented much like a judge's 
ruling, while providing no notice of the actual issues to be tried, clearly the duty of 
the prosecutor?) Did the hearing officer then make an unbiased decision in finding 
the one conviction that he needed for his $100? Of course not. He decided that the 
illegal rule of law invented by his boss the prosecutor from her ghoulish imagination 
would be the rule that he would apply, despite his obvious knowledge that such rule 
cannot possibly be lawful. It violates due process to base a conviction solely upon the 
hearsay evidence tossed into the record at the last minute by a notoriously dishonest 
prosecutor and further proves the bias of the hearing officer. 
Although Provo City tries to excuse itself by noting the one week for additional 
evidence given appellant, it neglected to tell this court that the hearing officer limited 
the evidence that he would accept to only the provision of a building permit. The 
owners of buildings rarely if ever retain building permits and only careful 
investigation of city records can provide relevant evidence. In this case the custodian 
of the records suddenly left for "vacation" and the records were not accessible. (It 
would not be surprising to discover that her sudden "vacation" was motivated by her 
apprehension that the evil empire dominating Provo was about to be discovered by an 
uncompromising reformer.) Due process was never provided. Instead, the biased 
hearing officer admitted the hearsay, did not provide for cross examination, and 
7 
invented "constructive notice" as his excuse for Provo City's failure to give actual 
notice and failure to provide actual due process. 
The District Court refused to admit appellant's proffered affidavit on one of the 
issues that potentially could have ameliorated some of the due process violations that 
now remain uncured and require reversal. Instead the District Court in its Ruling 
makes the not very lucid statement (and untrue comment) that, "Both parties agree 
that this court's review of the actions of the hearing officer are limited to a review of 
the record generated in the hearing." (Ruling, page 2) Although the theory is 
inherently a rather crazy one, Provo City seems to be implying in its sketchy brief that 
notice and due process violations during a hearing can be cured after a hearing. But 
they can in no way be "cured" when no further evidence can be introduced despite 
appellant's proffer. 
The double jeopardy issue is not "mute" (moot) because Provo City has brought a 
formal motion in the District Court for a new trial, has aggressively pursued this 
violation of the double jeopardy clause, has kept the motion apparently still pending, 
and may renew its efforts at any time. It is appropriate for judicial economy to decide 
also this ancillary issue, already joined and briefed by the parties in the record from 
the lower court, instead of letting it develop into a wasteful second appeal. 
Conclusion 
Appellant was denied all of the core requirements of due process of law. He did 
not actually know what issues the prosecutor would raise at the hearing and was actually 
surprised by them, denying him a meaningful hearing. This lack of adequate notice can 
be justified by neither the oxymoron of "constructive notice/9 nor by the contradictory 
bamboozlement that it was "appellant's fault" that he did not receive adequate notice. 
The purported "conviction" was based only upon the last minute, casual hearsay confided 
by the flagrantly dishonest prosecutor in a surprise claim at the end of the hearing while 
the actual witness was impossible to cross examine even after the hearing because of her 
sudden "vacation." In his review, District Court Judge Schofield found that the order 
requiring appellant to pay the hearing officer $100 for his services was "patently unfair." 
Pursuant to the Supreme Court guidelines established in V-l Oil, the hearing 
officer is presumed to be biased because of his receipt of $100 in "costs" whenever he 
finds a conviction. There is also ample evidence of hostility and actual bias from the 
record as an alternative ground to reverse his conviction because he was not the neutral 
decision maker required for due process of law. 
This case is a shocking inditement of the Provo City Court because not just one, 
but all of the core requirements for due process of law were deliberately denied. The 
conviction should be reversed by this Court of Appeals. 
As ancillary relief within the liberal authority of a court of equity, this court 
should also order the City of Provo to reimburse all other defendants who were charged 
$100 in "costs" along with a letter explaining how their core rights to due process were 
denied and their appropriate recourse, or direct or at least recommend that Judge 
Schofield so provide. 
DATED this 23th day of January, 2002 Respectfull^Submi 
Certificate of Service 
T hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, in the United States Mails, postage 
prepaid, on this 11th day of February, 2002, a true and correct copy of the foregoing, 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF to the following: 
David C. Dixon 
Attorney for Provo City 
P.O. Box 1849 
Provo, Utah 84603 
